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INTRODUCTION

T

HE HOME TO the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is 999 University The ICAO Council, presently
composed of thirty-three States, is the governing body that is
elected by the Assembly for a three-year term.' This was indeed
in the text of Article 502 as amended by the 21st Session of the
Assembly on October 14, 1974, which entered into force on February 15, 1980. As the arguments I make in this Article can only
be better appreciated in the light of the ICAO's aims and objectives (to be carried out by the Council), it is essential to say a
word or two about them in this introduction. These center
around what the Preamble of the Chicago Convention refers to
as the formulation of principles and arrangements geared towards the safe and orderly development of international civil
aviation; a process that, in turn, should ensure that international
air transport services may be established on the basis of equality
of opportunity and operated soundly and economically.'
The avowed aims and purposes of the ICAO, as set out in Article 44 of the Chicago Convention and reflecting the Preamble
previously cited,
are to develop the principles and techniques of international air
navigation and to foster the planning and development of international air transport so as to:
(a) Insure the safe and orderly growth of international civil
aviation throughout the world;
(b) Encourage the arts of aircraft design and operation for
peaceful purposes;
(c) Encourage the development of airways, airports, and air
navigation facilities for international civil aviation;
(d) Meet the needs of the peoples of the world for safe, regular, efficient and economical air transport;
I See Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, art. 50, 61 Stat.
1180, 1195, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, 330-31 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
2 The metamorphosis through which the original 1944 text has become what it
is now can be found in Christopher T. Tourtellot, Membership Criteriafor the ICAO
Council: A Proposalfor Reform, 11 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 51, 73-74 (1981) and
Nicolas Mateesco Matte, The Chicago Convention-WhereFrom and Where To, ICAO?,
19-1 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 371, 376 (1994). For a comprehensive survey of the
composition of similar governing (or executive) bodies of other international
governmental organizations, see Werner Guldimann, The Chicago Convention Revisited: Possible Improvements After 50 Years, 19-2, ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 347, 35354 (1994).
3 Chicago Convention, supra note 1, 61 Stat. at 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. at 296.

1999]

CRITIQUE OF COUNCIL ELECTIONS

(e) Prevent economic waste caused by unreasonable
competition;
(f) Insure that the rights of contracting States are fully
respected and that every contracting State has a fair opportunity
to operate international airlines;
(g) Avoid discrimination between contracting States;
(h) Promote safety of flight in international air navigation;
(i) Promote generally the development of all aspects of international civil aeronautics.4
Just how extensive these purposes make the ICAO's jurisdiction has generated heated arguments within the academic community that would also be useful to review for a better
understanding of this Article. The failure or inability of the Chicago Convention attendees to reach a consensus on economic
matters has already been the subject of a considerable amount
of literature. 5 Nevertheless, I do not think the Chicago Convention's production of an agreement involving technical and navigation issues rather than economic policy6 could necessarily
accord weight to the interpretation of Article 44 by some authorities as confining the ICAO to "[s]pecialized regulation of technical standards with respect to such matters as air traffic safety." 7
The ICAO's Legal Bureau Director at the time, Dr. Michael
Milde, also pointed out that the Convention established the
ICAO as "an international organization with wide quasi-legislative and executive powers in the technical regulatory field and
with only consultative and advisory functions in the economic
sphere."8 This argument might not arise if the suggested
merger of the ICAO and the International Air Transport Association (IATA) 9 was effected in Chicago. The suggestion Dr.
Tourtellot makes about the helpfulness of the hybrid International Labour Organization's (ILO) comparison to the ICAO
4 Chicago Convention, supra note 1, 61 Stat. at 1192-93, 15 U.N.T.S. at 326.

5 See Tourtellot, supra note 2, at 51 (where some of the authorities are cited,
including THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, LAW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL CrIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION 7-16 (1969)); see also PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION 7-16 (1987); Michael Milde, The Chicago
Convention-Are Major Amendments Necessary or Desirable 50 Years Later?, 19-1 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 401 (1994).
6 See Tourtellot, supra note 2, at 51.
7 RichardJanda, Passing the Torch: Why ICAO Should Leave Economic Regulation of
InternationalAirTransport to the WTO, 20-1 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 409, 416 (1995).
8 Michael Milde, The Chicago Convention-After Forty Years, 9 ANNALS AR &
SPACE

L. 119, 122 (1984), cited in

DEMPSEY,

9 See Tourtellot, supra note 2, at 72.

supra note 5, at 12.
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could be quite interesting in the event of such a merger. It is
likely that the ICAO itself would be a completely different organization today but for the Chicago Convention's keeping of
"the administration of safety and technology separate from ecou
nomic matters.""
Dr. Tourtellot too could be placed on the
side that considers the ICAO as being limited to technical
matters.
Consequently, the ICAO or "this international body, bringing
together aviation interests alone, [and which] has insufficient
incentive or will to create an open structure for trade"" has
been coolly instructed by Professor Richard Janda of McGill's
Institute of Air and Space Law not to hope to "become the institutional home for a liberal multilateral agreement on trade in
air transport services," 12 as well as not to "presume [ ] that there
will always be an "air transport industry" organized on the same
basis."' 3 Rather, according to the McGill professor, the ICAO
should know "[i]t is far better to presume that air transport
forms an integral part of global service markets and has a home
in the GATS [General Agreement on Trade in Services].""
While this Article agrees with most of what Professor Janda
says about the ICAO, it clearly would differ on the breadth of
the Organization's jurisdiction. To attempt to confine this twoheaded monster (considered to be "one of the most intrepid
international . . . [organizations ever] adopted by man, render-

ing immeasurable service to international civil aviation, which is
undoubtedly one of the most vital and dynamic human endeavours in international relations"'") would seem to be both
artificial and incorrect. This could be especially so in view of the
provisions enshrined in the objectives (e) and (i) set out above.
Moreover, Professor Dempsey of the University of Denver College of Law, after meticulously canvassing the ICAO's functions,
held that, in addition to the comprehensive, but largely dormant, adjudicatory and enforcement jurisdiction held by the
ICAO under Articles 84-88 of the Chicago Convention, "the
agency also has a solid foundation for enhanced participation in
10 Id.
11 Janda,

supra note 7, at 410.
Id.
13 Id. at 430.
12

14 Id.

15 Ruwantissa I.R. Abeyratne, The Economic Relevance of the Chicago Convention - A
Retrospective Study, 19-2 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 3, 4 (1994); see also Richard B.
Lillich, Editor's Foreword to BUERGENTHAL., supra note 5, at viii.
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economic regulatory aspects of international aviation in Article
44, as well as the Convention's Preamble."16 Werner Guldimann
certainly agrees with this view that Article 44 is "very inclusive
and modern in character" although he regrets its making "no
reference to the environment.. . [and should consequently] be
amended to include the protection of our environment from
impairment due to [civil] aviation as a fundamental aim and objective of the Organization." 7
Therefore, Professor Dempsey's only warning and advice
(largely shared by this study) to the ICAO is that it should
very soon assume[ ] the role its constitutional framers had in
mind for it in 1944, [or else] the regulatory void over non-tariff
barriers in international service industries such as air transport
will soon be filled by the empire builders of UNCTAD [United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development] or GATT
[General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]. 1 8
In flatly refuting Professor Janda's suggestion that the ICAO
"cannot, will not and should not become the institutional
home" for regulation of economic matters regarding air transport, and concerning which ICAO must be displaced by the
World Trade Organization (WTO), "a body not beholden to any
particular industry," 9 Professor Dempsey authoritatively states
that
[only] ICAO has the [best] expertise the international aviation
industry needs to establish useful ground rules to enhance the
flow of commerce. ICAO must become more deeply involved in
economic regulatory matters, lest it loses that opportunity to an
agency less well equipped to handle the complex trade problems
unique to aviation.20
This view would thus place the ICAO in the forefront of handling economic as well as technical and other matters surrounding international aviation-the ICAO's so-called sole
specialization or domain in the global division of labor.
The economic principle of division of labor seems to be the
rationale for the United Nations (UN) system of specialized
agencies. But it is underlined by the more important motivation
of avoiding over-politicization of international activity that was
supra note 5, at 302.
Guldimann, supra note 2, at 357.
18 DEMPSEY, supra note 5, at 302.
19 Janda, supra note 7, at 410, 412.
16 DEMPSEY,
17

20 DEMPSEY,

supra note 5, at 302 (emphasis added).
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sure to occur within the UN. This view could be buttressed by
the illuminating statement of Professor Herbert George
Nicholas, renowned analyst of international and comparative
political institutions. According to him, it was believed and
hoped that the creation of these specialized agencies
would absorb, one by one, successive fields of international activity and might even [in the] end, like the Lilliputians ....
[tie]
down the Gulliver of politics while he slept, so that the world
would find itself governed and controlled without ever having
consciously yielded up those abstract rights of sovereignty which
arouse such fierce political passions and prejudices. 2
But whatever the rationale for having these agencies, it is certain that it would not have furnished any reason for the ICAO
restrictionists to capitulate. ProfessorJanda would strongly disagree with Professor Dempsey's last statement, believing instead
that only the WTO, through the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), has the necessary "accumulated experience
and expertise in the international administration of trade liberalization ; 22 a matter on which the ICAO, as the entrenched
home of "classic rent-seeking behaviour by a particular interest
group," is known to have always "tip-toed around the prospect of
a re-structure."23
This debate on competence of specialized agencies is sure to
continue. But the pro-WTO camp seems to be gaining in both
the number and weight of arguments, especially as the ICAO's
executive body is now not only drifting towards untouchability,
but also becoming more and more absolutist. These are tendencies that can only "help to stifle the growth of international air
transport. '24 This might also justify the admonition that the
Chicago Convention not be considered "sacrosanct," and that
the organization must support a discussion on its review and the
improvement of the working methods of the organization, "to
avoid the danger of stagnation and inertia always inherent in the
anxious preservation of the status quo."2 5 The present contribution is in the same line of perceiving the matter as the analysis
21 H.G. NICHOLAS, THE UNITED NATIONS AS A POLITICAL INSTITUTION 6 (2nd ed.
1963); see also KURTJACOBSEN, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS - A
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT, INEQUALITY, AND RELEVANCE (1978).
22 Janda, supra note 7, at 416.
23 Id. at 414-15.
24 Id. at 414.
25 Milde, supra note 5, at 414.

1999]

CRITIQUE OF COUNCIL ELECTIONS

345

on the recruitment methods for that executive body would
show.
The ICAO Council would have been shown by several experts
to be principally a first world "club." Much more important to
this entire paper, then, would be the question of what the third
world states could do to exert any influence on policy in the
ICAO as they are said to be doing elsewhere.26 I propose two
interconnected theses: (1) that the third world (with particular
emphasis on Africa) must stop behaving like beggars and learn
to fend for themselves (how they should do so is simple enough
as I demonstrate herein), and (2) that the ICAO Council now
wields more than enough power to be able, if it so desires, to overcome the so-called stumbling block to international civil aviation
called national sovereignty and all its corollaries, and thus, provide the people of the world with a real, efficient, cheap, and
economical air transport as promised them at Chicago some
fifty-four years ago. The ICAO can thus very easily help the
third world help itself. Let's now proceed to demonstrating
how, using Council elections.
After having clothed itself with its own officers, the ICAO Assembly would then proceed to the heralded Council elections,
which usually attract the main attention and require at least two
meetings. According to Article 50(b), the Assembly should
choose Council Member States under the following three headings: (1) States of chief importance in air transport (whatever
that means), (2) States that do not fall under the first class but
which make the largest contribution to the provision of facilities
for air navigation, and (3) States belonging to neither of the
first two groups, but whose designation will ensure that all the
major areas of the world are therein represented. 27 These elections modalities will be examined under two main parts. The
first will deal with the election of the Council members of
26 "The Third World voting majority," according to Professor William C. Olson
of the American University, "has promoted the advancement of economic development as the UN's first concern." THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 76 (William Clinton Olson ed., 7th ed. 1987). But see Mwalima Julius
K. Nyerere, Address to the Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77 (Feb.
12, 1979), in 3 KARL P. SAUVANT, THE COLLECTED DOCUMENTS OF THE GROUP OF
77 433-34 (1981).
27 SeeChicago Convention, supra note 1, 61 Stat. at 1195, 15 U.N.T.S. at 330-31.
For a compendious, incisive, and instructive comparison of the similar criteria of
other organizations, and, in particular, the World Health Organization (WHO),
International Labor Organization (ILO), International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), and United Nations (UN), see Tourtellot, supra note 2, at 68-73.
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groups one and two, since (1) both take place on the same day,
one immediately following the other; and (2) no challenge has
so far arisen here. The second will then analyze the controversial make-up phase of the election of council members of group
three.
II.

THE PRINCIPAL PHASE OF COUNCIL ELECTIONS

This part involves a brief survey of the criteria for election,
comparing them (where necessary) to similar instances in other
organizations. It also illustrates how the ICAO may need to be
refashioned, using the experiences of the Republic of Korea to
indicate how membership in the Council is not based on any
so-called statistical basis (e.g., the volume of international aviation), but solely on mere extraneous political judgment.
A.

THE CRITERIA

The criteria to be considered in electing members of the
Council are clearly indicated. But the plain fact is that the Convention itself has furnished no guidance as to how we should
interpret the concept of "adequate representation. 2' 8 The question has, consequently, been posed: does "chief importance" imply the most far-flung airlines, the greatest number of
international passengers, or the largest manufacturing industries? The attendees have avoided these questions, leaving the
electors (in the Assembly) to decide appropriate interpretations. Dr. Tourtellot has analyzed at length some of these electors' interpretations of the plainly vague language of Article
50 (b).

29

In the past, for instance, representation on the Council has
always reflected a situation in which air routes were concentrated in States owning many operating agencies. At the moment, however, air routes cover most parts of the globe and
traverse States whose geographical situation and facilities guarantee satisfactory results in the economy and safety of air operations, one of the main purposes of the Convention. Should
representation on the ICAO Council not now reflect this?
Should States providing such vital airway facilities and whose geographical position creates an unbroken chain of services for air
routes not be allowed a wider participation?
28

29

Milde, supra note 5, at 434.
See Tourtellot, supra note 2, at 59.
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His excellency T.M.H. Thajeb of Indonesia (a country spread
over large areas of sea and which, consequently, greatly depends
on civil aviation as the primary means of communication),
rightly thought these countries should be allowed wider participation. 0 This Delegate would notjust be saying so because he is
Indonesian. One session before him, the Venezuelan delegate
gave the same opinion about Indonesia, which is "a country that,
for a number of reasons, including its geographical position,
played a very important role in the development of civil aviation."" l The obvious problem that this geographic criterion
could create is that, were such geography to be adopted, every
country, even the land-locked mini-States (as is evident in some
of the irrelevant speeches in the Assembly) would claim entitlement to being so placed. For example, we already hear claims
such as "Burkina Faso is enclosed by other countries and serves
as a country of transit; '3 2 and "Lebanon, because of its privileged geographical position-it is a true meeting point for Europe, Asia and Africa-expects to retain the role it has always
played in international trade. ' 3 Whatever the case, the present
practice in electing ICAO council members is highly questionable (especially in view of the permanently stationed nature of
some members) and needs reconsideration.
B.

INCOMPREHENSIBLE

COUNCIL ADMISSION:

KOREA'S CASE

The example of the United Nations' express creation of permanent members in its Council would be laudable. Otherwise,
de facto Council membership (e.g., Australia, Brazil, Canada,
France, United Kingdom, United States, and the former Soviet
Union 34 ) in the face of wasteful elections, as is the case in the
ICAO, would appear to defeat the very concept of an election.
There is a disproportionately strong presence in the ICAO
Council of the States from Western Europe in general and the
European Union in particular. At the same time, "it is not easy
35
for "new entrants" to gain a seat on this Council."
30 See Minutes of the Plenary Meetings, at 7-8, ICAO Doc. 8269 A14-P/21 (Aug. 21Sept. 15, 1962).
31 RESOLUTIONS, REPORT AND MINUTES, at 25, ICAO Doc. 8167 A13-Min. P/2
(June 19-21, 1961).
32 Plenary Meetings Minutes, at 61, ICAO Doc. 9550 A27-Min. P/1-16 (Sept. 19-

Oct. 6, 1989).
33 Minutes of the Plenary Meetings, supra note 30, at 12.
34 See Tourtellot, supra note 2, at 59, 63.
35 Milde, supra note 5, at 435; see also Tourtellot, supra note 2, at 62-64.
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At the 27th and 29th Sessions, for example, the Republic of
Korea (one of Professor Dempsey's "Asian tigers [who] might
well eat the lunch of the U.S. flag carriers because of their comparative cost advantage, as well as their relatively higher service
levels" 13 6 ) could not get into that Council. During the elections
at the 29th Session in 1992 in particular, Korea was the lone
candidate that failed to get in, ranking last in group two, with
only fifty-five votes.3 7 This would be particularly disturbing, especially given that this Republic "statistically ranks 8th or 9th in
the world in the volume of air transport. '38 The Korean Delegate himself was entirely at a loss to figure outjust what a seat on
the ICAO Council could entail. After thanking the few donors
of the meager fifty-five votes, the distinguished delegate turned
to the entire Assembly with these thought-provoking words:
Before closing, I would like to take a moment to share a few
thoughts with you. One of those concerns the criteria for
electability to membership on the ICAO Council. We have already informed you that the Republic of Korea ranks eleventh in
the volumes of traffic that consist of passengers, mail and freight
- ranking sixth in freight alone. We are also about to embark
upon the construction of one of the largest airports in the world,
that will become a hub of the air link between Asia-Pacific and
the world. We have been a member in good standing of ICAO
since 1952. These were not good enough to place us in the
Council seat. This has puzzled us. One other point I would like to
refer to is whether the current practice of electing Council Members is "fair and equitable" in distributing Council seats to the
Third World States and the small States in the North. We would
recall that a fair and equitable distribution of representation in
the decision making in International Organizations is the corner39
stone of nations working together under one roof.
These wise words would puzzle any right-thinking member of
the international aviation community. Resentment over the
Council's dominance and the perceived inequitable geographical distribution of seats led to amendments to the International
36

Paul Stephen Dempsey, Airlines in Turbulence: Strategies for Survival, 23

TRANSP.

L.J. 15, 92 (1995).

57 See Plenary Meetings Minutes, at 128, ICAO Doc. 9601 A29-Min. P/1-14 (Sept.
22-Oct. 8, 1992).
38 Milde, supra note 5, at 435 n.121. Even leaving Korea as a nation aside, AsiaPacific is known to be "growing fastest" with astounding projections of passenger
growth. See the impressive statistics given by Dempsey, supra note 36, at 27 n.27 &
81-82.
39 Plenary Meetings Minutes, supra note 37, at 129.
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Maritime Organization (IMO) Constitution in 1968, substituting
the ratio 6:6:12 for the original formula in Article 16(1) of its
1948 Constitution; the current ratio is 8:8:16.40 In the early days
of the ICAO, according to Dr. Tourtellot, "the argument for regional diversity was more valid because so few African and Asian
states were members. The limited number of category III positions permitted more representation from the Americas and Europe. From 1956 to 1959, the eve of widespread third world
independence, three European countries held seats in category
III. Two elections later, in 1962, no European countries held
category III seats."4
We may, however, wonder why Korea, with all the preponderant evidence, took no positive action against what it saw as an
injustice of the system or a violation of the spirit of the Convention. Here, like in the Air Navigation Commission (ANC) appointment affair,42 the rights of the contracting States were not
impeded or derogated by the outcome. Korea rather preferred,
"[i]n spite of the outcome of the election, ... to remain faithful
and loyal to the principles and the objectives of the Chicago
Convention, as we have always been in the past."43 Perhaps the
situation would have been better explained if the Republic of
Korea had emulated Liberia (which did not have enough of this
Korean forbearance with a similar interpretation of the IMO
Convention) ."4 This should have given us some idea of what exactly being a State "of chief importance in air transport" or
"which make [s] the largest contribution to the provision of facilities for international civil air navigation" is understood to mean
by the ICAO Council (under Chapter XVIII) or the International Court of Justice (ICJ).45
The entire Chapter XVIII (Articles 84-88) of the Chicago
Convention on the settlement of disputes4 6 is very questionable.
The particular situation of the Council settling disputes in which
40 See KENNETH R. SIMMONDS, THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION 710 (1994).
41 Tourtellot, supra note 2, at 62 n.66.
42 As to the details of which, see Ebere Osieke, UnconstitutionalActs in International Organisations:The Law and Practice of the ICAO, 28 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 1, 8
(1979).
43 Plenary Meetings Minutes, supra note 37, at 129.
- See discussion infra notes 51-58.
45 Chicago Convention, supra note 1, 61 Stat. at 1195, 15 U.N.T.S. at 330-31.
46 For a discussion of the procedures and cases, see BUERGENTHAL, supra note
5, at 123-97; Osieke, supra note 42, at 8-14; Michael Milde, Dispute Settlement in the
Framework of the InternationalCivil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in INTERNATIONAL
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it is a party would, of course, drag in the 58th ILO Session criticisms that "[flor the Conference first to condemn and then to
call for inquiry, the terms of reference of which would be to
confirm such condemnation, would be to offend the principle
of due process on which all our 4work
relating to the implemen7
tation of the Convention rests.
Even the case of the ICJ would not be free of criticisms with its
perceived limitations to adequately respond to an international
crisis.
Chapter XVIII of the Chicago Convention has been
held to be "one of the weakest and least effective parts of the
Chicago Convention ' because "[t]he results of these interventions [under it] are not encouraging for the future of adjudica50
tion in the Council."

Maybe (all those criticisms notwithstanding) the Republic of
Korea realized that it would have made no difference, with its
possible substitution for another Asian or third world nation, as
was the situation in the Liberia case. In a similar election to the
IMO's fourteen-member Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) Liberia and Panama ranking third and eighth respectively, in
world shipping activities could not gain admission. Liberia, like
Korea, could not understand why and went to court. This led to
an advisory opinion of the ICJ as to whether a MSC elected on
January 15, 1959, was "in accordance with the Convention for
the Establishment of the Organization." 51 The court, on June 8,
1960, held in the negative. It decided that: (1) the eight largest
shipowning nations of Article 28 (a) were the eight nations with
the largest tonnage registered under their flags, (2) the registered tonnage criterion was exclusive and it was unnecessary to
consider the linkage between the vessel and flag, and (3) the
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO)
Assembly had a mandatory, non-discretionary obligation as to
the election of members of the MSC.
287-90 (M. Milde & M. Siciliano
supra note 5, at ch. 15, especially 293-302.
47 Osieke, supra note 42, at 2; see also PETER H. RUSSELL, THE JUDICIARY IN CANADA: THE THIRD BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT (1987); Robert F. Kennedy, Libya v.
United States: The InternationalCourt ofJustice and the Power ofJudicial Review, 33 VA.
J. INT'L L. 899 (1993); Heidi K. Hubbard, Note, Separation of Powers Within the
United Nations: A Revised Role for the InternationalCourt ofJustice, 38 STAN. L. REV.
165 (1985).
48 See Hubbard, supra note 47.
49 Milde, supra note 5, at 441.
50 Matte, supra note 2, at 379.
51 As to details, see SIMMONDS, supra note 40, at 9-15.
AVIATION ORGANIZATIONS - CASES AND MATERIALS

eds., 1994),

DEMPSEY,
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What was really intriguing in the Liberia challenge was that a
two-tiered re-election then followed during which Liberia (but
not Panama) gained admission with States like France and Germany (ranking 9th and 10th respectively in world shipping tonnage) maintaining their places. Moreover, the so-called second
stage of the election was by "secret ballot," which has been aptly
described as "prevent[ing] any transparency of the process. "52
As Dr. Milde tersely adds, the whole electing process is "a process which is traditionally well orchestrated prior to, and during,
the Assembly."5" Indeed, what actually happened was a mere
substitution of one third world nation for another with no
change in the rest of the seats. Professor Simmonds succinctly
put it when he affirms that "the end result was that Liberia now
appeared in the principal group of eight members and the
United Arab Republic disappeared from the group of six members, all other seats being retained." 4
But an aspect of Professor Simmonds's criticism of the court is
itself highly untenable. The professor has trenchantly criticized
the decision, stating that there should have been linkage so that
the court's decision was "disappointing in its application of the
rules of treaty interpretation and unhelpful to the purposes and
functions of' the organization. 5" I would, however, doubt the
relevance of such linkage, especially knowing that the mere fact
of registration and nationality would impose both rights and duties56(or responsibilities) on the state of registry and/or nationality.
It should be stressed, furthermore, that this nationality
concept now in aviation took roots from maritime practices.57
Linkage in this case would have the effect of allowing the concerned State only the responsibilities attached to, and not the
rights accruing from, those acts. 58 This is as untenable as the
pre-arranged winning and losing of Council seats.
52

Milde, supra note 5, at 434.

53 Id.

54 SIMMONDS, supra note 40, at 15.
55 Id. at 13.

56 See Chicago Convention, supra note 1, art. 17-21, 61 Stat. at 1185, 15
U.N.T.S. at 308; see a/soJoseph Z. Gertler, Nationality of Airlines: Is it a Janus with
Two (or More) Faces?, 19-1 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 211 (1994).
57 See B. Cheng, Nationalityfor Spacecraft? (1992) (full reference not given) as
found in SPACE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS: DOCUMENTS AND READINGS 50 (Supp. I
1996 IASL, McGill University, Ivan A. Vlasic, ed., Supp. 1 1996).
58 Some of these gross violations do take place simply because most of these
third world States lack adequate representation (i.e., by people who are knowledgeable in what is going on) since the right people are hardly put in the right
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The pre-arranged winning and losing may probably explain
why sometimes a State is said to have "won an election" for a seat
on the prestige-oriented ICAO Council even without its knowledge. To some critics,
perhaps an entirely new convention should be drafted [as] [w]e
all know these principles [of Art. 50] have become highly theoretical over the years. Elections in the Assembly are politically
orchestrated, primarily by the Third World countries for the sake
of greater regional representation, especially in the second and
third categories .... [T] he problem is apparently one of prestige
and international bureaucratic interests, which should be
eliminated.5 9
Poor third world, a world which is supposed to be with no
interests. I am no defender of the current third world way of
looking at the issues, but several commentators would strongly
object to Rocha's proposals because "[s]pecific limitations
upon... [their] representation would be politically unacceptable
as a rejection of the principle of equality of states."6 I also favor
not specifically limiting their representation, but I do not agree
with the current idea of equality of states as it is employed in
ICAO because it does not help the third world states at all. Just
how equal are these "equal States?"' 6' The current practice is
apparently one of prestige and international bureaucratic interests and should be eliminated. The difference is mostly in how
to effect the elimination.
This decried orchestration by the Council can be realized in
often-heard declarations during election time such as:
[m]y country, which was first elected to that Council in 1980, was
unable to sit on it for reasons beyond its control. Today, Cameroon would like to be able to count on the firm support of all of
you for its election to the Council during the present session.
And it expresses its infinite gratitude to you in advance.6 2
What would be incomprehensible, absent political orchestration, is that Cameroon in fact went in. No one is suggesting that
it was/is incompetent as a member. Not at all. If anyone had to
unnecessarily do that it would not be one of its own citizens, for
place. Their systems are largely built on patronage rather than merit or
competence.
59 Ernesto Visquez Rocha, Toward A New InternationalCivil Aviation Convention?, 19-1 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 477, 477-78 (1994).
64 Tourtellot, supra note 2, at 75.
61 See infra Part III.
(;2 Plenary Meetings Minutes, supra note 37, at 119.
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sure. But during the greater part of that entire term (to the best
of my knowledge), as the Council has been going about its duties, Cameroon's contribution to the cause has simply been its
empty seat. Meanwhile, States like the Republic of Korea and
many others, which would have actively and willingly contributed both ideas and material, are out in the cold.
The questions one could ask here include: what actually could
have been the reasons beyond Cameroon's control that it could
not take its seat in 1980? Did it not overcome those inhibiting
conditions before coming to demand the seat again in 1992?
What happened this time? What does the ICAO Council have to
say? In fact, there would appear to be no need for wasting time
and expenses conducting "elections" when the same results can
simply be achieved more pragmatically (and honestly) by having
certain entrenched States in the Council, with the others coming in, from time to time, with "new blood" in a rotating manner. Moreover, "[w]ith a smaller Council and no election
categories, the Assembly would still be obliged to acknowledge
certain issues of priority to the more influential States, merely
for reasons of political convenience, seeing that without their
support ICAO would be meaningless."63 These changes would
improve the efficiency of the organization in terms of management and time.64
The present scheme only unsuccessfully tries to fool people
that those "elections" do matter. Dr. Tourtellot, like several
others, after a careful review of the various schemes (such as
regional and sub-regional blocs) devised by states in order to
secure especially the category III seats,65 came to the inevitable
conclusion "that membership criteria and the election process
in the ICAO no longer function satisfactorily." 66 The hypocrisy

involved in the whole process is even conspicuously magnified as
far as the category three states are concerned. Did not the Convention itself talk of their designation?
III.

THE MAKE-UP PHASE OF COUNCIL ELECTIONS

This part looks at Nicaragua's allegation that the Assembly's
Rules of Procedures regarding this Make-Up phase are both unRocha, supra note 59, at 478.
Id.
65 See Tourtellot, supra note 2, at 63-67; see also Rocha, supra note 59, at 477-78;
Guldimann, supra note 2, at 354; Milde, supra note 5, at 434-35.
66 Tourtellot, supra note 2, at 67.
63

&4
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just and unconstitutional. The Assembly's response to this challenge will also be evaluated. This response will be shown to
furnish further reinforcement to the vexed notion of the
ICAO's Subordinate Supreme and/or Supreme Subordinate Organ(s).

It will also take a look at the Council's "pragmatic solution" to
the dilemma created by Article 94(a); showing how this so-called
solution has taken away in a seemingly very innocuous manner
the Assembly's most "drastic action" against a contracting State
under Article 94(b). Finally, this part examines the associated
question of delegation of powers by the Assembly to the Council
and "other bodies." Some proposals in regard of the third world
are also tendered in the course of all these. As previously indicated, the rules regarding this phase of council elections have
been challenged for being both unjust and unconstitutional.
Without further ado, I will proceed with studying those two issues, beginning with the injustice charge and how to go about it.
A.

THE INJUSTICE ISSUE AND WHAT COULD BE DONE

The injustice could be seen in at least two respects. First, the
rules accord undue advantage to some States while robbing
others of the virtually nonexistent chance to gain admission on
the much-cherished Council. In other words, they sacrifice
those States that can only get in through this particular door.
The current practice would seem to be designed to promote the
saying, "to those who already have much, more is given; and
from those who do not have much, more is taken." This is a sort
of plain denial of the "equitable geographical representation
principle" that is, prima facie, meant to be promoted. What a
paradox!
Secondly, injustice is done even to those States that have
worked hard and achieved victory through doors one and two by
beating the very States that they thereafter have to sit and rub
shoulders with in the Council anyway. The practice could be
likened to Britain beating Argentina at the World Cup semi-final
only to find itself at the final being pitted against the same Argentina. Maybe the Republic of Korea realized this nonsense
when it refused to proceed to the poor-man field after its incomprehensible so-called defeat in the rich field? But not all others
would be as civilized to think and behave like this forbearing
and over-civilized Korea or rights-defending Liberia.
These rules have also been challenged as being at variance
with the Convention's provisions. The Canadian delegate at the
Fifth Session, seconded by the Portuguese delegate, indicated
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that Rule 4 was in conflict with Article 48(a),67 with the delegate
of Iraq also doubting if Rule 44 did not contravene Article
48(b).6 8 The French delegate, on his part, defended the Rule 4
stance by indicating that two considerations influenced it. First,
there was no dual representation in U.N. meetings, although
that organization's rules contained no provision to that effect, it
apparently being axiomatic that a delegate represented only one
State. Second, when considering on November 2, 1948, the
question of dual representation at ICAO meetings that the
French delegate had pursued, the Council decided that there
was no objection to the participation of two or more States
through a single individual "in any ICAO Divisional, regional or
similar special meeting," this wording having been deliberately
chosen to exclude this kind of representation in meetings of the
Assembly.6 9 It should be mentioned, however, that the French
delegate concluded that the Universal Postal Union (UPU) specifically permitted the representation of two States by one person.7" The question to ask is: why should the ICAO want to
emulate the U.N. only here?
It is even doubtful if Article 50(b) itself does not contradict
the sacrosanct principle of sovereign equality found in the Preamble and Article 1 in particular of the Chicago Convention.
This view would seem to be supported by the "more visionary
than practical" suggestion "reflected [in] the enlightened attitude of two small states active in the aviation field"' (i.e. Australia and New Zealand). Even pragmatic Mr. de Brito Subtil of
Portugal could see "no justification for treating the Contracting
States differently," 72 especially so just after having solemnly
avowed and declared their unqualified "equality" with each having one equal vote, with equal say in their unequal airspace.
The idea of "one man/one vote," which has now been accepted
as a norm in almost all political systems, was introduced into
institutions of the international system by the twentieth century
idea of formal equality among nations.7 v
67 Proceedings of the Fifth Session of the Assembly, at 46, ICAO Doc. 7203-C/830
(June 5-18, 1951).
68 Id. at 48.
9 Id. at 46.
70 Id.
71 Tourtellot, supra note 2, at 60.
72 Minutes of the First Plenary Meetings, at 5, ICAO Doc. 7297 A6-P/2 (May 27,
1952).
73 See JACOBSEN, supra note 21, at 26.
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This sovereign equality principle, unrealistic and objectionable as it may seem, is already well-entrenched in public international law.74 Kurt Jacobsen sees the problems of balance
between political institutions and other centers of power in a
system as being no less in international institutions than in the
case of national ones. Two reasons given for this are: (1) there
are only a few states in the international system and they show
extreme differences in their power bases, and (2) normally the
states, not the institutions, possess most of the means to implement policy, especially in the case of coercive power.75
Indeed, this principle that each state, however small, however
artificial, has one vote, 76 which is already well-entrenched in international practice, has been criticized as unrealistic not only
for ignoring the vast differences of material capability among
states, but also for its combination with the majority rule. 77 "A
separate question worth serious consideration," Professor
Michael Milde indicates, "is whether weighted voting should not
be introduced in the [ICAO] Assembly, at least in the decisions
on the budget of the Organization: without the concurring votes
of the main contributors any budgetary decisions may prove unrealistic and futile."78 Professor Peterson answers in the affirmative, though taking population (and not financial contribution)
as the weighting gauge: "it would make voting in the General
Assembly conform more closely to the democratic notion of
treating each person as equally significant. ' 7' The professor indicates immediately that this proposal "will never be adopted...
because more states would lose than would gain from the
change.""" But quite apart from Peterson's reasons for refusal,
another common and apt criticism of it comes from the United
States. According to Stephen Schwebel, most of these assem74 See Chicago Convention, supra note 1, Preamble 61 Stat. at 1180, 15 U.N.T.S.
at 295. For space law, see Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, G.A. Res. 34/68, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., at 77,
U.N. Doc. A/Res/34/68 (1979), and Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, 206-08.
75 SeeJACOBSEN, supra note 21, at 26; see also THEODORF A. COULOUMBIS &JAMES
H.

WOLFE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL R:ELATIONS: POWER AND JUSTICE

24-

27 (2d ed. 1982).
7
See NictIoLAS, supra note 21, at 201; see also SAMUEL SHI1H-TsAI CHEN, THiE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 56-57 (1971).
77 See MJ. PETERSON, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN WORLD POLITICS 55-56 (1986).
78 Milde, supra note 5, at 432.
79 PETERSON, supra note 7, at 56.
80 Id.
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blies are "composed on the basis of the unrepresentative principle of sovereign equality of states, states which in turn are
represented by governments so many of which are themselves not representative of their peoples.""I
It would appear to me that should weighting be adopted at
all, the criterion ought to be financial contribution. This will
not only tie in with the suggestion that those with much at stake
ought to be in control, but it could also aid in securing capable
states to be represented on the Council, while at the same time
encouraging the others to improve their situation.8 2 This is a
possible and acceptable means of helping the third world help
itself and at the same time furthering the aims of the ICAO. Let
us explicate by hinging on the foregoing criticisms of the sovereign equality rule. The questions raised by, or implicit in, those
criticisms center around the larger one of reconciling equality
(or justice) and power. First, how does the strength of the nations in the international system help explain the level of activity
in the Assembly? Second, what difficulties are encountered, if at
all, in implementing decisions taken in accordance with the
equality principle but without the support of the stronger nations? These are certainly not new issues, being as old as the
modem state itself. The General Assembly, formally based on
the principle of sovereign equality, does not reflect this principle in its actual operation. Without going into details here,8" we
may simply "state that the representation,behavior, and interactionin
the GeneralAssembly to a large extent is dependent on the power or capabilities of the various members."84
It has been suggested in some quarters that ideal equality
among nations should be understood only with respect to their
status in the organization (ICAO for instance) and nothing else
because equality at all times would be impossible in the system.
For example, only one state at a time can have the floor of debate, and all cannot be members of a limited membership or81 Stephen M. Schwebel, Address to the American Branch of the International
Law Association (Nov. 3, 1978), in DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1978 (1980), in PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR LAw: DOCUMENTS AND
MATERIALS 20 (Ivan A. Vlasic ed., 3d ed. ISASL, McGill University, 1995) (emphasis added).
82 See, e.g., COULOUMBIS & WOLFE, supra note 75, at 60; Gunther Teubner, The
Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism, 13 CARDOZO L. RiUv. 1443, 1446
(1992).
83 For elaborate discussions, see JACOBSEN, supra note 21, at 132-70. See also
COULOUMBIS & WOLIE, supra note 75, at 2.
84 JACOBSEN, supra note 21, at 27.
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ganization at the same time.85 This suggested solution would
seem to be flawed because "status" in the Assembly, it would appear, cannot be safely divorced from the powers, privileges, and
obligations or responsibilities conferred by it. For instance, the
U.N. General Assembly stage affords the "new boys" (some of
whose population would fit comfortably into two city buses86 )
not only the opportunity "for the assertion of their new-found
personalities";

7

but, more importantly, the power to influence

or change the course (or sometimes even block progress altogether)88 on issues literally unconnected to their status in the organization. Otherwise, what else would explain "what
disgruntled Northerners call the "mechanical majority:" a teeming, depressingly uniform array of African, Asian, and even
Latin American states [which] [i] n the ICAO Council... has ...
absorb [ed] most of the category III seats that might otherwise
have gone to the small states already long established?"8 9 Status
in the organization cannot therefore be divorced from the attributes of that status, and the suggested interpretation would
thus not seem to answer the question.
I would be as audacious as to advance some proposals here,
notwithstanding their obvious controversial character, since they
certainly would touch those abstract rights of sovereignty that
are said to always arouse fierce political passions and prejudices.
The ICAO should put aside the delusive idea of sovereign equality and make this very important membership to the Council
dependent on (1) positive contribution to air transport, and (2)
meeting the Article 37 requirements (Adoption of International
Standards and Procedures), without the application of the "general escape clause" within Article 38 (which must then find a
resting place in limbo). These suggested conditions are intertwined. These considerations, on their part, would further
other objectives of the Convention while principally meeting the
promise of cheap, efficient, and economical air transport to the
5 See id. at 132-33.

See Tourtellot, supra note 2, at 75.
supra note 21, at 200.
88 See Nasrollah Entezam, Foreward to H. FIEL HAViLAND, JR., THE POLITICAL
ROLE OF THEt GENERAL ASSEMBLY (1951) (stating that "indeed at times they have
prevented the General Assembly from going astray and guided it to the right
track. One outstanding illustration ....[being] [t] he representative of Haiti, who
proved how important the role of a small nation can be and how one vote can
affect the destiny of a country during the question of Libyan independence
before that Assembly."). Id. at vii.
86

87 NICHOLAS,

89 Tourtellot, supra note 2, at 66.
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peoples of the world. These suggested criteria would obviously
engender some finger-pointing. But because we must face the
obvious facts, I have anticipated and attempted answers to the
following sure complaints.
1.

Keeping Out Smaller Poor States?

Of course, one could be told that this proposal will keep out
smaller, poor or mini-states from the international aviation
sphere altogether. It would, therefore, the argument would
continue, be a violation of their right under Article 44(f), as outlined above in the introductory part of this Article. Before proceeding any further to indicate that this is simply not the case, it
would perhaps pay off torecall some proposals in the same line
which were jettisoned, but today their logic haunts us.
At its formation, the Netherlands proposed that membership
to the U.N. be made dependent upon the existence in the applicant State of "political institutions which insure that the state is
the servant of its citizens," 90 that is, its having a democratic, representative and responsible government. This was rejected then
as being "an undue interference with internal arrangements."9 '
This stance or rationale paradoxically turned a complete blind
eye to the very thing the U.N. was doing to the Spanish when it
was busy insisting on keeping their country out "until a new and
acceptable government is formed in Spain. 92 Who was then not
interfering in a country's internal affairs? Who can even convince us so far that these same small and poor States are not now
being kept out? Double standards may be the rule then. This
awkward situation would not have arisen if the Dutch proposals
had been accepted outright; complaints such as Stephen M.
Schwebel's would not be heard as often today. 93
Coming back squarely to the two suggested criteria for membership to the ICAO Council, they would rather encourage
smaller States to pool their resources and efforts and operate
more viable, competitive, and efficient joint air transport agencies. Even keeping this prestigious Council membership aside,
90 HAvILAND,

supra note 88, at 29.

91 Id. at 30.
92 Specialized Agency Agreement with ICAO; full text cited in INTERNATIONAL
AvIATION ORGANIZATIONS-CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 46, at 42-44. The
ICAO's compliance with it took the form of an Annex B (Article 93 bis) of the
Chicago Convention. Chicago Convention, supra note 1, art. 93, 61 Stat. 1206, 15
U.N.T.S. at 358.
93 See Schwebel, supra note 81, at 20.
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international air transport is currently going through a period
of dynamic change as a result of increasing competition, transnationalization of business, globalization of the world economy,
and the emergence of regional economic and political groupings, privatization of service industries, and the introduction of
new global trading arrangements for service sectors. Necessitated by the ever-changing technology in the field, the international air transport industry is now faced with the almost
irreversible trend of oligopolization and extremely high investment. Against this scenario alone, would one not naturally
think that the time may be ripe for developing countries in general, and Africa in particular, to take a more balanced and serious look at the possibility of pooling resources together in order
to jointly operate more efficient, competitive, and viable air
transport agencies? Only by doing this could we hope to hear of
"African Tigers" that could even smell (let alone eat) the lunch
and/or supper of U.S. and EU flag carriers.
Could joint air transport organizations or agencies (which the
Chicago Convention even implores the Council to encourage 4)
not provide a better nucleus and locomotion (than the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Charter presently does) for the
eventual emergence of a United States of Africa (USAF)?
Would the world's complex metamorphoses outrun Africa's
ability to devise new mechanisms of legal, political, and social
cushions? Would Africa not be flexible enough to adjust its perceptions to changing global realities? Would Africa not be able
to exchange conventional mental habits for ones more suitable
for understanding unconventional circumstances or phenomena? What, if at all, could Africa learn in this regard from the
European Union's experiences? Would "Mama Africa" never
wake up from her long sleep?
Not only does the Chicago Convention make room for these
joint ventures; in addition, there are living examples, such as the
Scandinavian Air Systems (SAS), to adaptively emulate. The
prospects and challenges involved in such ventures for Africa
cannot be extensively canvassed in this Article, but could be a
possible and interesting area of further research. The proffered
criteria would thus not be any attempt to keep them out. On
94 Chicago Convention, supra note 1, art. 78, 61 Stat. at 1202, 15 U.N.T.S. at
348. The Council is especially mandated to "suggest to contracting States concerned that they form joint organizations to operate air services . . . in any regions." Id.

19991

CRITIQUE OF COUNCIL ELECTIONS

the contrary, it could be a sound way of showing them how to
fend for themselves and stop waiting on the ICAO, which they
would then also be able to positively influence. Has it not been
said that it is better to teach a hungry person how to grow the
crop rather than to give this person prepared food? The present ICAO scheme would only go a very long way to encouraging
complacence, especially in the third world. Most of these third
world states on the Council, especially those from Africa, are
therefor nothing else except mere prestige; this does not help
them influence things at all.95 With the suggested pooling of
resources (and why not even entering into federal unions96 ?),
they would probably not only meet the indicated criteria for
ICAO Council membership but also be able to sponsor well-todo representatives to the ICAO Council meetings at which most
of the important business, including the sometimes untoward
amendments to their meager rights, occurs.
2. Amending the Amending Formula?
Of course, the suggested proposals, it would be quickly indicated, can only be effected through an amendment of Articles
38, 50, and 94 in particular, or an overhaul of the entire Convention. Even as far back as the very controversial Eighth Session: "the Assembly was virtually unanimous in feeling that there
was something lacking in the Chicago Convention that had to
be remedied. The difference of opinion was on when and how
the omission should be rectified."97 Such a process of amending
95 See Ram S. Jakhu, The Evolution of the ITU's Regulatoiy Regime Governing Space
Radiocommunication Services and the Geostationary Satellite Orbit, 8 ANNALS AIR &
SPACE L. 381, 400-01 (1983).
96 "If it is [truly] desired to assure the development of the group of adjacent
States, it will be necessary to by-pass the formula of the common market, which
risks giving the definite advantage to the countries with the most important natural resources, and to consider recourse to a political federation. The backward
countries could thus acquire greater power of negotiation. Their peoples would
then obtain larger benefit from the advantages of the more advanced countries."
GILBERT TIXIER,

A

COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF THE CAME-

ROONS AND THE IVORY COAST

87 (1974); see also Thomas M. Franck, The East Afri-

can Federation, in WHY

FEDERATIONS FAIL: AN INQUIRY INTO THE REQUISITES FOR
SUCCESSFUL FEDERALISM 3 (Thomas M. Franck ed., 1968); PAUL BIYA, COMMUNAL
LIBERALISM 134 (1986).

97 Delegate of Brazil at the 8th Session; see Minutes of the PlenaryMeetings, at 56,
ICAO Doc. 7505, AS-P/10 (June 1954). As to details of why this 8th Session is
controversial, see Peter Ateh-Afac Fossungu, The ICAO Assembly: The Most Unsupreme of Supreme Organs in the United Nations System? A CriticalAnalysis of Assembly
Sessions, 26 TRANSP. L.J. 1 (1998).
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or overhauling, it has been held, would not be implemented
before the first part of the twenty-first century because any
change to Article 94 itself would be subject to the procedure
within the present text. 98 Those could be palpable obstacles
indeed.
But it might appear that they would not be so but for the fact
that the Council, in an open and naked Olympian affirmation of
its powers, had deprived the Assembly of its one and only effective power over recalcitrant non-ratifying member States under
Article 94(b). This was effected through the Council's so-called
"pragmatic solution." It has been sufficiently indicated how the
question of whether a State that had not ratified an amendment
increasing the membership of the Council could vote and/or be
voted on "was resolved in a most pragmaticfashion. At the 14th Session of the Assembly . . . [during which] the Plenary accepted,
without a vote and without a recorded objection, the view of the Exec-

utive Committee that any State participating in the Assembly
could be a candidate in the election, . . . whether or not it had
ratified the amendment to the Convention. ,9

This so-called "pragmatic solution," like Hitler's war cry of
"self-determination" for German minorities within the boundaries of Germany's neighbors, would have now been employed
not only as a tool against the ICAO Assembly (the immediate
target like Czechoslovakia) but also as one against the U.N. itself
(the entire world). The U.N./ICAO Specialized Agency Agreement would now appear to stand in the same position as the
piece of useless paper British Prime Minister Chamberlain
waved to his countrymen on his return from the Munich meeting with the Fuhrerwhile dogmatically announcing that he had
brought "peace of our time."
The so-called solution not only creates ghost members in the
Council 00° among other paradoxes created, but also illustrates
how such ad hoc methods postpone the problem rather than
solve it. Chamberlainism or superelastic appeasement did only
98 See Guldimann, supra note 2, at 352.
- Michael Milde, Chicago Convention-45 Years Later: A Note on Amendments 14

L. 203, 208 (1989) (emphasis added); see also BUERGENTHAL,
supra note 5, at 43.
100 If Cameroon has ratified the amendment increasing the size of Council to
thirty-three but Nigeria has not, the former may not be in that Council (though
still being there) in the estimation of the latter, especially since the former is
elected in group three before which the Council might already have the maximum number that the latter is still
sticking to. I could write a whole book on this
ghost membership issue alone, but let us leave it at this level.
ANNALS AIR & SPACE
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postpone Hitler's war. Professor Groom has identified this and
perhaps the idea behind it when he wrote that generally, political leaders are preoccupied by short-term considerations and
there is no effective constituency for the long term since to
them what happens then will be someone else's problem-a
problem made more acute because of the lack of appropriate
and timely action now. 10 ' Moreover, he carries on, consensus
political leaders do not have time to think, being engulfed by
the questions of the day and the emotional and mental stability
10 2
perhaps even before political values and intellectual insight.
And his conclusion is that in "the long term, the innovatory,
anything out of the ordinary is thus at a discount until it forces
itself, perhaps in a calamitous manner, on the center of the
political stage." 0° A clear example of the last sentence would be
the KE007 incident wherein a Korean Airliner was downed by
the Soviet Union. Let us leave all that aside and elucidate how
and why the UN could be, or has been, affected.
It is thus not inconceivable that some Members would easily
put a big question mark after that "pragmatic solution" whenever it stands against their perceived national interests as the
following illustration may concretely show. Australia has not yet
ratified the amendment to Article 93 bis, which was introduced
on May 27, 1947 by the Assembly and came into force on March
20, 1961 in States which ratified it.'1 4 That amendment states:
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 91, 92 and 93
above: (1) A State whose government the General Assembly of
the United Nations has recommended be debarred from membership in international agencies established by or brought into
relationship with the United Nations shall automatically cease to
be a member of the International Civil Aviation Organization;
(2) A State which has been expelled from membership in the
United Nations shall automatically cease to be a member of the
International Civil Aviation Organization unless the General As-

101 See A.J.R. Groom, Reflections on a Changing System, in GLOBAL ISSUES IN THE
UNITED NATIONS' FRAMEWORK 235, 290-91 (Paul Taylor & A.J.R. Groom eds.,

1989).
102 See id.
103 Id.
Switzer104 See Annual Report of the Council, at 95-97, ICAO Doc. 9637 (1994).
land, which has ratified the amendment, can be expelled under it but not suspended thereunder. See BUERGENTHAL, supra note 5, at 52-54.
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sembly of the United Nations attaches to its act of expulsion a
15
recommendation to the contrary. °
Now, should Australia, a founding and entrenched Council
member be expelled from the UN, but constitutionally or conventionally would refuse to cede its seat in the ICAO Council
because it has never accepted that automatic termination of its
ICAO membership, occurs upon exclusion from the UN. In
other words, would the recalcitrant "member" in this scenario
be Australia in the ICAO or the ICAO in the UN system? Of
course, commonsense would suggest the latter. Would the
ICAO Council not have used its "pragmatic solution," initially
fashioned in demonstration of its alpha-and-omega status within
the ICAO, to invalidate the Agency Agreement?
But what if ICAO, to eschew the description of a recalcitrant
member, now insists upon Australia's expulsion? Would Australia, like Spain did, simply pack bags and leave with "we could
hardly accept the role of an unwelcome guest"?1 " 6 The response
would certainly be anything but yes. Some authorities would
also think "it is by no means clear what the status of an expelled
state is in relation to the states that have not ratified Article 93
bis."' 7 One could not fail to indicate here that this Australian
situation is one of those real eventualities where "[t]his pragmatic experience, which has been perpetuated since 1962,
[would doubtlessly] lead[ ] to the conclusion that amendments
to the Chicago Convention dealing with institutional problems
of the Organization are deemed [not] to come into force erga
omnes."' 8 This interpretation could be fortified with the issue of
the majority required for drastic action against such a recalcitrant state.
3.

What About the Majority for the Drastic Action?

It would also seem that the solution through Assembly pressure under Article 94(b) would not be likely to succeed. This is
because such "drastic action" (which "[t]he Assembly has not
availed itself of . . even though it has adopted a number of
important organizational amendments over the years""0 9 ) would
105 Chicago Convention, supra note 1, art. 93 bis, 61 Stat. at 1206, 15 U.N.T.S.
at 345.
106 BUERGENTHAL, supra note 5, at 41.
107 Id. at 43.
l0 Milde, supra note 99, at 208-09.
10'BUERGENTHAL, supra note 5, at 39.
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inevitably require a two-thirds majority. The third world states
(with "heavily subsidized, uneconomic State airlines... contrary
to the need for increased business links and trade growth in the
developing countries"' 10) to be directly affected by the proposed
changes constitute "the mechanical majority" of more than half
of the Assembly; an Assembly which Stalin disdainfully termed
"a talking shop for the underlings."111 For example, the said
countries are said to be assured (from their claim of being nonaligned) of the support of at least seventy-four countries,
namely, "forty-two African countries [that] expressed their opposition to liberalized market access, lowering of foreign investment restrictions and any moves in the direction of a right of
establishment, while defending the continued use of State aids
and subsidies to ensure survival of uneconomical airlines . ..
and.., of sixteen
[plus] an overlapping group of 16 Arab States
1
2
States."
Caribbean
and
American
Latin
These countries, rightly or unjustifiably, "fear that the disappearance of their carriers could mean the disappearance of reliable service. Once a national carrier has disappeared, what is to
from curtailing or discontinuing
prevent a foreign-based carrier
3
an unprofitable service?""
As the argument would then run, they could very easily block
any decision in the direction I am suggesting, especially as existing statistics would even show that just "66 African, Arab,
Latin American and Caribbean countries constitute over one
third of the ICAO contracting States, although their regions account for only 13% of international traffic and 10% of total domestic and international traffic."" 4 This would be in contrast
with Asia (another portion of the third world) which, through
hard work and the desire to succeed instead of folding arms and
complaining very loudly like Africa," 15 already gravely threatens
the first world. This study does not, it must be repeated, advocate for their going out of the airline operation business. What
it does call for is their doing it effectively and efficiently, which
they can only seriously do if they pool their human and material
110 Janda, supra note 7, at 427; see also NEAL RIEMER, POLITICAL SCIENCE: AN
INTRODUCTION TO POLITICS

185 (1983) (declaring how most of them are "not

even developing").
111 NICHOLAS, supra note 21, at 183.
112 Janda, supra note 7, at 413.
11

Id. at 415.
at 413.
See Nyerere, supra note 26, at 132.

114Id.
115
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resources by leaving aside this mere prestige of flying the flag no
matter how inefficiently and uneconomically it is being flown.
This could be the only answer these States have for surviving in
the 21st century which, undoubtedly, is one for an oligopolized
airline industry, a century in which even unoligopolized mega
carriers may find it hard to survive in. How should the ICAO's
part come about in all of this?
4.

Principled and Foresighted Use of the Pragmatic Solution

The inevitable answer to the question would be from another
question; namely, to know just how other measures have until
now been adopted in the ICAO despite their obvious adverse
affect in the majority States. It all eventually boils down to
where we started: Article 94(a) and the "pragmatic solution."
The ICAO Council should now employ the "solution" to give the
people of the world the kind of air transport that the Chicago
Convention promised them. This Council must then pragmatically make its membership dependent not on wasteful and deceitful elections, but on the criteria I have just indicated and the
many other worthwhile ones that have been advanced by other
writings. A State or group of them would be free not to fulfill
the conditions; but that would mean it should not hope to join
the prestigious ranks of the ICAO Councilors. The Council
must do so to be able to convince us that it has not turned the
powers conferred upon it at Chicago to solely furthering, to the
utter neglect of the raison d'etre of the ICAO, its own institutional
value-even when it would mean committing unconstitutional
acts to achieve that.
B.

THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY QUESTION AND ANSWER

Questions of unconstitutionality often arise regarding what
has been termed the "disregard of established constitutional
procedures and due process."" 6 The query as to the legal effect
of the acts of international organizations, which were not in conformity with their constitutive instruments, has given rise to conflicting points of view.'1 7 The Council election of 1956118 was

important for a number of reasons. The fourth since the
ICAO's establishment in 1947, it was the very first in which the
Osieke, supra note 42, at 2-3, 14-20.
See id. at 20. The author discusses some of them in regard to ICAO at 21-23.
11s For a catalog of the various council elections and the states that have been
therein represented until 1980, see Tourtellot, supra note 2, app. at 79-80.
116

117
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number of candidates exceeded the places to be filled.1" 9 The
Federal Republic of Germany refrained from presenting itself as
candidate here simply because it had been a member of the Organization for only about a month. The vote resulted in two
changes in the Council Membership, Sweden taking the "Scandinavian seat" previously held by Norway and Japan replacing
the Philippines. 20 In such a scenario, the "pro-forma procedure" commonly used where "there were as many seats as candidates" a2 1 must then be abandoned. Consequently, dormant
"centrifugal forces" and interpretations would be bound to be
drawn into play as is always the case when a nation's abstract
interests are imperiled. According to the Nicaraguan delegation that withdrew their candidate just before balloting (in protest against the procedure to be followed), the provision in Rule
22
57 was categorically unconstitutional. 1
Maintaining that it was contrary to the letter and spirit of Article
50 of the Convention, they proposed an amendment that would
have required the Assembly, after balloting for the first two categories had been completed, to specify the major geographic areas of the world still unrepresented on the Council and would
have included in the list of candidates for election in the third
category only such States not elected in the first or second category as came from those areas.' 23 The saneness of these proposals could hardly require amplification.
Most delegates opposed this principled approach and the Assembly, therefore, decided to follow the same course as it had in
1954 when Rule 57 had been unexpectedly questioned. It asked
the Council to study it, circulate appropriate material to the
Contracting States with a request for their comments, and, after
considering any comments received, present its recommendations to the Assembly "as soon as practicable."1 2 4 As a first step,
"9 See Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly for 1957, at 58-59, ICAO Doc.
7866 All-P/3 (May 20-June 2, 1958). Twenty-four candidates for twenty-one
positions.
120 See id.
121 Tourtellot, supra note 2, at 62.
122 States failing to get elected in the first and second categories are automatically included in the list of candidates for the third category (States whose
designation will ensure adequate geographical representation). See Proceedings of
the Fourth Session of the Assembly, at 28-30, ICAO Doc. 7225-C/834 (May 30-June
20, 1950). For other similar charges of unconstitutionality, see Osieke, supranote
42, at 14-20.
123 Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly for 1957, supra note 119, at 52-53.
124 See id.
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the Council requested the advice of the Legal Committee, with
the expectation that a sub-committee would be established to
study the matter and report to the Eleventh Session of the Committee. The Council thus hoped to be in a position to make a
recommendation to the Assembly in 1958.125
One would be inclined to think that such a recommendation
has never been submitted, since the ICAO is to this date still
using the contested procedure. How soon is "as soon as practicable?" Or did the recommendation make a determination
against the Nicaraguan proposals? Whatever the case, our interest here would not be so much in whatever the Council put or
did not put forward; that would not significantly affect the consequences to be drawn from the Assembly's response to that
challenge of unconstitutionality of its own rules determined by it.
Was the Assembly thus delegating its powers under the
Convention?
1.

Delegation of Powers?

In not acting when and where it should have acted and instead looking up to the Council, was the Assembly exercising its
constitutional right to delegate to the Council? As previously
noted, the Assembly has as one of its funny powers and duties,
the delegation of powers to the Council. They would seem to
have this quality not only because they are not the "crucial
ones," but more importantly also because of two essential considerations. First, most, if not all, of them are so carefully
hedged that the Assembly would simply not be free to act in
their regard without the Council having first pulled the gear
lever. This concerns what could be termed (i) the "reference
duties," exemplified by Article 49(c) under which the Assembly
has to examine and take action on the reports of the Council
and decide on any matter referred to it by the Council. It is important to note here that "any matter" cannot include anything
that has not been specifically referred to it by the Council; and
(ii) the "linked duties" such as Article 49(e). Second, the no-go
areas to this Assembly (i.e., Council's exclusive competence) are
elastic enough to cover all of these listed non-exclusive powers
and duties of the Assembly.
Thus, Article 49, which could be taken as cover here by the
Assembly in the present controversy, clearly stipulates that:
"[t]he powers and duties of the Assembly shall be to: . . .(h)
125

See id.
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[d] elegate to the Council the powers and authority necessary or
and
desirable for the discharge of the duties of the Organization 126
revoke or modify the delegations of authority at any time."
What these powers and duties specifically entail would be
hard to tell. But, if the question of delegation is answered in the
affirmative, were the conditions for such delegation met? Are
there any non-delegable functions of the Assembly?
It is submitted that the Assembly, regarding the particular issue in question (its own rules of procedure), could not have
been delegating under Article 49(h) because (1) the power or
duty could be non-delegable and (2) conditions necessary for
such action may not have been met. For example, was the purported delegated power "necessary or desirable for the discharge of the duties of the Organization?"'127 And could the
Assembly thereafter "revoke or modify the delegations of authority at any time?"'128 Of course, it would hardly be said that
these conditions could be, or were, met. Or could/were they?
Assuming even that they were, it could not still shield the Assembly from rebuke.
A further criticism could be that the response of the ICAO's
most distinguished Assembly, that is, in referring the matter to
the Council, can only go deeper into exposing its acceptance of
its subordination to, and helplessness without, the Council.
First of all, there would seem to be no logic in asking the Council to decide on its own rules of procedure, which it itself (exercising its basic constitutional rights and prerogatives under
Article 49(d)) brought into existence. This interpretation will
clearly come within the Legal Bureau's stipulation that: "[t]he
powers of the Assembly were at any given time, those which were
in accordance with the provisions of the Convention and could
not be deemed to extend to such powers as might later accrue
entry into force of an amendment to the
by virtue of the
9
Convention."12

126

Chicago Convention, supra note 1, art. 49, 61 Stat. at 1194, 15 U.N.T.S. at

330.
See id.
See id.
129 Minutes of the Executive Committee, 18th Session of the Assembly of the ICAO,
at 54, ICAO Doc. A18-Min. Ex/1-16 (June 15-July 7, 1971), cited in Osieke, supra
note 42, at 18.
127

128
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The case of the United Nations General Assembly Special
Committee 3 0 is graphical here. The General Assembly never
delegated this issue to the Security Council because it is, of
course, independent and supreme. Otherwise, the ICAO Assembly would be telling us that making of its own rules was not
the case as it certainly would seem not to have been.
When a national Parliament or Congress enacts a law or regulation and thereafter realizes that the enactment is attacked as
unconstitutional by one of its own members, does that entity
turn over the matter "for consideration" to the executive
branch? Certainly not if it is the supreme organ. What is usual
for Congress to do? Two alternatives are available. One is to
"consider" the matter itself through its relevant committee (s) as
the UN General Assembly did. The second choice involves expressly asking the judges (and not the Council as the ICAO Assembly did) to decide the issue. After all, is that not the reason
for having the ICJ within the UN system?
Perhaps the ICAO Assembly took this to be an issue falling
within the purview of Article 54(n)? (By it "[t]he Council
shall: . . . (n) [c]onsider any matter relating to the Convention
which any contracting State refers to it.")'' If so, was it "any
contracting State" that referred the matter to the Council? Of
course not. Perhaps the Assembly might also have thought the
matter was one for the Article 84 procedure? Article 84 may also
be excluded. Appeals from the Council lie to the UN organ, the
ICJ, (or other arbitration tribunals). But this should not be
taken to mean that a case cannot be taken directly to the ICJ
without its having gone first through the Council. The Liberia
case discussed above is an example. Discussing Article 84 of the
Convention, Ebere Osieke even argues that:
since the power of the Court [ICJ] is derived from Article 84 of

the Chicago Convention which applies only to any disagreement
between "two or more contracting States," a decision concerning
a disagreement between the Council and a contracting State or
between two organs of the3 2ICAO, cannot be the subject of an
appeal under that Article.
See Report of the Special Committee on Measures to Limit the Duration of Regular
Sessions of the GeneralAssembly, U.N. GAOR, 8th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item 54, at
2-13, U.N. Doc. A/2402 (1953), reprinted in S.D. BAILEY, THE GENERAL. ASSEMBLY
130

OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A STUDY OF PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE

323-30 (1960).

Chicago Convention, supra note 1, art. 54(n), 61 Stat. at 1197, 15 U.N.T.S.
at 336.
132 Osieke, supra note 42, at 13-14.
131
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This could only be understood to mean that excluded matters
or disagreements must in the first instance lie only to the ICJ.
Were it to be otherwise, it would be a naked installation of the
Council as both definitive judge and party. This would not only
offend common sense but also render the entire adjudication
process farcical "and difficult to sustain as a public
institution."' '
The present case would clearly be within those excluded disagreements. It is not a question between contracting states inter
se as in India v. Pakistan (1952),134 United Kingdom v. Spain
(1967),' 135 or Pakistan v. India (1971);136 nor even as in Libya v.
United States,137 whose "order of the World Court of 14 April
1992 does not appeal to the professional instincts of an international lawyer."' 138 The present case instead concerns a dispute
between a contracting State and the Assembly as an organ instead of "other contracting states" regarding its internal rules.
The Council could therefore not come into play here since (1)
this is not even a dispute "relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention and its Annexes," 139 and (2) nor is it
"on the application of any State [such as Nicaragua] concerned
in the disagreement. " 1" °
The Council's involvement in this case can only go a long way
to telling us that it, and not the Assembly, brought the rules of
procedure into existence. This could even be evident in the
French defense of the rules. 4 ' If this suggestion is true, the
vexed issue of usurpation of the Assembly's functions under Ar1'3 RUSSELL,
134

135

supra note 47, at 20.

For discussion of which, see Milde, supra note 46, at 289-90.
As to the instinctive memorials of both parties, see PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL

AIR LAw: DOCUMENTS

AND MATERIALS,

supra note 81, at 216-32.

See BUERGENTHAL, supra note 5, at 123-97; DEMPSEY, supra note 5, at 293-302;
Milde, supra note 46, at 287-90; Osieke, supra note 42, at 8-14.
137 A very insightful discussion of the case has been done by Kennedy, supra
note 47.
138 C. Tomuschat, The Lockerbie Case Before the International Court ofJustice THE
REVIEW, INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OFJURISTS (1992), in PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
AIR LAw: DOCUMENT AND MATERIALS, supra note 81, at 48.
139 Chicago Convention, supra note 1, 61 Stat. at 1204, 15 U.N.T.S. at 352. This
stance, no doubt, may be somewhat difficult to sustain as the attack of the Rules is
solely predicated on the Convention. It would thus be hard to separate the two;
to that extent, the entire dispute could then be regarded as one of the application or interpretation.
140 Chicago Convention, supra note 1, 61 Stat. at 1204, 15 U.N.T.S. at 352 (emphasis added).
141 See Proceedings of the Fifth Session of the Assembly, supra note 67, at 46, 48.
136
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ticle 49(d) would then inevitably follow. As Judge Lacks has
stated: '[i]t is important for the purposes and principles of the
United Nations that the two main organs with specific powers.., act in harmony-though not, of course, in concert-and
that each should perform its functions . . .without prejudicing
the exercise of the other's powers."' 4 2
At this level, the issue would have to become an inter-organ
one, which, as previously indicated, is not also covered by Article
84 of the Convention. The ICJ alternative consequently ought
to have been pursued by Nicaragua, even if the Assembly itself
did not do so. It would not have been setting any precedent as
Liberia's case has been taken before within the UN family regarding the same type of election to the venerated Council or
Governing Body. But, since Nicaragua did not, the elected
Council stands unchallenged. There is another reason why this
Council could boast about it: being seemingly given cover by the
Assembly's uncertain powers.
2.

What then are the Assembly's Powers Proprement Dire?

This question would be particularly important in the light of
an informed look at the Council's "14 mandatory and 5 permissive functions outlined in Articles 54 and 55 of the Convention,
respectively." 14 3 Could the Assembly successfully hide behind its
discretionary delegation? In other words, could we also dismiss
the possibility of its hiding behind Article 49(g)-its discretionary delegation power? Article 4 9 (g) would seem to answer in
the negative when it stipulates that the Assembly shall "refer, at
its discretion, to the Council, to subsidiary commissions, or to
any other body any matter within its sphere of action." 4 4 This
would seem to provide a comfortable hiding ground for the Assembly's criticized response to Nicaragua's challenge. Delegating "any matter within its sphere of action" in this instance to
whichever of the listed bodies is entirely "at its discretion." But
there the matter ends.
This attempted cover could simply be equated to "the illusion
of subordination [of the Council] to the universal body"'1 4 5
which is very cleverly and innocuously embedded in Article
142 Libya v. United States, I.C.J. 114 at 139 (1992), cited in Kennedy, supra note
47, at 923 n.ll0.
143 DEMPSEY, supra note 5, at 274 n.9.
144Chicago Convention, supra note 1, art. 4 9(g), 61 Stat. at 1194, 15 U.N.T.S.
at 330.

145 Tourtellot, supra note 2, at 56.

1999]

CRITIQUE OF COUNCIL ELECTIONS

373

50(a); or to the "ideological myth"' 4 6 that the ICAO Assembly is
the supreme organ of the Organization, having a "sphere of action of its own" that it can delegate "at its discretion." Indeed,
to shorten a long tale of two organs, all this "is simply to indulge

in self-delusion." 147 How and why?
First, could this Assembly, in exercise of its so-called discretion, refuse delegation and thereby effectively keep the Council
out of "its sphere of action?" It simply can or could not, and the
reverse would instead be the rule. The Council would seem to
be able to validly arrogate or assume this function, not so much
because it is delegated. Article 55(d) gives it the exclusive permissive function to "[s]tudy any matters affecting the organiza'' 48
tion ...and submit to the Assembly plans in relation thereto."
The present dispute would unambiguously be captured by the
all-embracing or catch-all phrase: "any matters affecting the organization." This is especially reinforced by Article 55(e) which
also makes the power of investigation the Council's exclusive
permissive function.1 4 9 Even though this latter function must
only be "at the request of any contracting State", the very fact
that, under it, the Council only issues "such report as may appear to it [Council] desirable" would make the Council the sole
15
decider of what may be encapsulated by the Article. 1 It is important also to note that, here, unlike in the case of Article
54(n), no "Contracting State" nor "any organ" need refer the
5
matter to it before the Council can assume jurisdiction.' 1
As previously noted, the conclusion could be that these principles would very effectively preclude the ICAO Assembly from doing anything whatsoever, except what the ICAO Council would
warrant or permit. Moreover, has it not even been made crystalclear by the Legal Bureau Director that the Assembly's powers
and duties, both implicit and ancillary, were specified in Article
49 as were certain specific limitations on those powers-for ex52
ample, Article 49(k) ?1
146 RUSSELL,

supra note 47, at 107.

147Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone, The Office of Lord Chancellorand the Separa-

tion of Powers, 8 CIV.

JUST.

Q. 308, 317 (1989).

148Chicago Convention, supra note 1, art. 55(d), 61 Stat. at 1197, 15 U.N.T.S.

at 336.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Chicago Convention, supra note 1, art. 49, 61 Stat. at 1194, 15 U.N.T.S. at
330.
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IV.

CONCLUSION

The entire constitutional and political set-up of the ICAO can
hardly be justified in both the spheres of democracy and of its
corollary, the supremacy of the Assemblies of international organizations. The result of this strange arrangement has been that
the majority of States simply cannot contribute to the advancement of the international aviation cause as they might have had
the ICAO Assembly had the voice and say that it now lacks. For
example, a country like Singapore, with a lot of aviation potential, though small in population and territory and coming from
the Southern Hemisphere, can scarcely make its views heard
since it is not a member of the Council. Entrance into this
Council has also been fashioned so that getting in is dependent
on the ousting of one of the ICAO Council's Asia-Pacific "giants" or "immutables" (Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Pakistan). Because these can hardly be thrown out,
Singapore (like many others) must therefore not be heard. This
would not have been the case if they could actively participate
through the Assembly like is the case in the other international
organizations. This curious framework does not argue well even
for the integrity of the ICAO itself.
The ICAO Council now wields more than enough power to be
able, ifitso desires, to overcome this stumbling block to international civil aviation called national sovereignty and all its corollaries, and provide the peoples of the world with a real efficient,
cheap, and economical air transport. Of course, the required
changes would necessitate an entire re-examination of the Chicago Convention. This would seem difficult to achieve, but it is
not impossible. The difficulties, no doubt, underlie the
problems of balancing power and justice. Hopefully, the ICAO
can advance further as it learns from its mistakes. Therefore, as
one of its 14th Session Delegates has rightly said, the ICAO must
not follow the example of the ostrich by putting its head in the
sand to avoid seeing dangers ahead. It must now face the
problems open-heartedly and honestly by creating an atmosphere in which these problems can be discussed freely and the
requisite modification effected. Otherwise, "we shall be in the
same boat again."1 53 Could we afford being in this same boat
without adequate paddles forever? Surely not, for in the absence of any form of trial in this direction, the words of Mayor
15- Minutes

1962).

of the Plenary Meetings, at 25, ICAO Doc. 8269/A14-P/21 (Aug. 21,
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La Guardia of New York at Chicago in 1944 would be apt: "the
meat is taken right out of the Convention. All the rest sauce.
Everybody prefers aircraft which do not break up in the air and
everybody, in aviation, is opposed to bad weather; but we must
go further than that, if we do not care for the sauce without the
meat!"' 5 4

154 Minutes of the PlenaryMeetings, supra note 30, at 49. "If there are unpalatable
facts to be faced, it is useless to blame those who discover them; harm can only
result from refusing to face them, or perhaps, even to grasp them." MICHAEL

DUMMETTr, VOTING PROCEDURES

12 (1984).
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